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SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY IN  
GREGORY OF NYSSA’S DE ANIMA ET RESURRECTIONE:  
ASTRONOMY AND AUTOMATA.1 
 
Abstract 
This article examines two sections of Gregory of Nyssa’s De anima et resurrectione 
which introduce scientific phenomena: from astronomy (eclipses; the phases of the 
moon) and physics (a water-device).  Each passage is set in its intellectual context and 
possible sources are suggested.  I argue that the water-device was part of an 
automaton, not a water-organ as previously argued.  The primary importance of these 
passages, however, lies in their role in Gregory’s dialogue as a whole: far from being 
merely illustrative or designed for rhetorical display, they drive the argument 
onwards.  The first example establishes a general epistemological principle 
(knowledge requires the cooperation of reason and sense-experience) which is applied 
to the second example’s argument for the existence of the soul.  Gregory uses these 
examples to emphasise the importance of matter as part of God’s good creation: this 
reinforces his later emphasis on the human body (especially its resurrection).  
Furthermore, the structure of each example mirrors a general movement in Gregory’s 
dialogue from a rejection of materialism, to an affirmation of the soul, and then to an 
emphasis on the co-dependence of the immaterial and material in creation.  They are 
thus both a microcosm of the treatise’s main argument. 
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 This piece has been developed from a paper first presented at the XXXV Incontro di Studiosi 
dell'Antichità Cristiana, at the Augustinianum, Rome,  (May, 2006).   
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Introduction 
 This piece will take a close look at two short passages in Gregory of Nyssa’s 
De anima et resurrectione: texts which deal with some basic questions in astronomy 
(eclipses and the phases of the moon) and with the construction of an object which 
makes a sound (which I will argue was part of an automaton).2  My interest in these 
passages derives not only from the description of the phenomena in question 
themselves, but also from the way in which they illustrate Gregory’s literary style and 
theological-philosophical concerns. 
 As is well known, Gregory’s De anima et resurrectione is a treatise on 
immortality and resurrection in dialogue form.  The dramatic setting is the death-bed 
of Gregory’s sister Macrina.  Gregory arrives, seeking consolation for the death of 
their brother Basil, only to find her gravely ill too.  Overcome with grief, he responds 
impatiently to his sister’s suggestion that he moderate his tears: ‘death then being 
naturally so terrible to us, how can it be easy for a survivor to obey this command to 
remain unmoved over friends departed?’3  Thenceforth, Macrina assumes the role of 
Gregory’s teacher, countering his objections and leading him to a deeper 
understanding of the Christian hope.  The dramatic setting in which one character 
faces death calmly and seeks to convert the fear and grief of the other(s) by the use of 
philosophy naturally invites the reader to compare Macrina with Socrates in the 
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 This text has not yet been published in Brill’s Gregorii Nysseni Opera.  I have consulted the edition of  
Franz Oehler, Gregor’s Bisshof’s von Nyssa, Gespräch mit seiner Schwester Macrina, Über Seele und 
Auferstehung, Leipzig, 1858; in some places this offers some useful modifications of the text in volume 46 
of Migne’s Patrologia Graeca (=PG46).  I have given references to both editions.  The precise passages 
under discussion in this paper are: Oehler pp. 325:41 – 327: 2 and pp. 327:28 – 328:39; PG46: 32:11 – 
33:35 and 36:25 – 40:4.  The translation cited is that by W. Moore in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 
Series, second series, volume V (abbreviated here as NPNF V); for these passages see pp. 433-4 and pp. 
435-6.  I have also consulted and sometimes quote the translation by Catharine Roth St. Gregory of Nyssa, 
The soul and the resurrection (St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, Crestwood, N.Y., 1993) (see pp. 37-43). 
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Platonic dialogue the Phaedo.4  Nevertheless, as other commentators have been quick 
to point out, Gregory’s dialogue is by no means a simple repetition of the Phaedo in a 
Christian mode.  For one thing, the Platonic resonances are complex, Macrina’s 
characterisation owing something to the mysterious Diotima in the Symposium as well 
as to Socrates himself.5  Furthermore, Macrina’s position in the dialogue is more 
vulnerable than that of Socrates in the Phaedo: Gregory the author cleverly uses the 
character Gregory to probe and question some of Macrina’s theological and 
philosophical assumptions so that by the end of the dialogue both characters have 
modified their original starting-points.6  Finally, it seems impossible to identify the 
views of either Gregory or Macrina in the dialogue with those of the ‘real’ Gregory 
(although some have tried): the author seems deliberately to be obscuring his 
authorial voice.7  
 The purpose of this article, however, is to examine another aspect of Gregory’s 
literary technique in the De anima et resurrectione: that is, his use of scientific 
analogies.  Just as his use of the dialogue form creates a dynamic which drives the 
argument forward so, I will argue, the scientific examples – when read in the context 
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 On this, see e.g. Arnaldo Momigliano, ‘The Life of Saint Macrina by Gregory of Nyssa’ in Arnaldo 
Momigliano, On Pagans, Jews and Christians (Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, Connecticut, 
1987), p. 208. 
5
 See e.g. Elizabeth A. Clark, ‘Holy women, holy words: early Christian women, social history and the 
‘linguistic turn’ ’, in Journal of Early Christian Studies, 6:3 (1998), e.g. p. 424; Catharine P. Roth, 
‘Platonic and Pauline elements in the ascent of the soul in Gregory of Nyssa’s dialogue on the soul and 
resurrection’ in Vigiliae Christianae 46 (1992) pp. 20-1; Burrus, Virginia, ‘Begotten not made.’ Conceiving 
Manhood in Late Antiquity (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California 2000), e.g. pp. 112-13. 
6
 Rowan Williams, ‘Macrina’s Death-bed Revisited: Gregory of Nyssa on Mind and Passion’, in Wickham, 
L. and Bammel, C. Christian Faith and Philosophy in Late Antiquity (= Supplements to Vigiliae 
Christianae 19) (E.J.Brill, Leiden, 1993), pp. 231-2. 
7
 Clark, ‘Holy women, holy words’, p. 426; Roth, ‘Platonic and Pauline elements’, p. 21; Burrus, ‘Begotten 
not Made’, p. 113; p. 122;  For an assessment of these readings of De anima et resurrectione see 
Morwenna Ludlow, Gregory of Nyssa, Ancient and (Post)modern (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), 
pp. 206-19. 
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of the theology of the treatise – can be understood not only as reflecting and 
reinforcing main themes of the work, but also as developing the course of its 
argument. 
 After the introduction which sets the scene, Gregory declares that he fears not 
only the dissolution of the body, but that of the soul also, and this confession leads 
Macrina first to ask him to refine his case and then to persuade him that his fears are 
false.  So, Gregory presents his sister with a dilemma: either, if the soul resides in the 
elements of the body, it is identical with them and will be dissolved with them upon 
death; or, if the soul is not in the elements of the body, its location is unknown.  (The 
implicit conclusion is that it is nowhere.)  Macrina ‘groans quietly’ at the way in 
which her brother grasps at ‘Stoic or Epicurean’ objections and launches an attack on 
a materialist view of the universe which particularly focuses on the errors of 
Epicurus.8  His fundamental error, she argues, was to fail to perceive anything beyond 
the material: he ignored the order of the universe and was thus blind to the one who 
created it.  Epicurus and those like him, Macrina asserts, failed to understand that ‘a 
Divine power, working with skill and method, is manifesting itself in this actual 
world, and, penetrat[es] each portion’,9 and, furthermore, that humanity is a 
microcosm of the world,10 reflecting the composition of the whole universe not just in 
the combination of different elements making up the body, but also in its combination 
of a material body with immaterial soul.  That this echoes, but is not exactly parallel 
to, the divine power working in the universe will become evident in the rest of the 
treatise.  Macrina then proceeds to argue that one needs to reason through one’s 
sensed perceptions of the world and of human nature in order fully to understand 
them. 
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 PG46: 21:12 – 24:35; Oehler 322:9-323:12 
9
 PG46: 28:5-7; Oehler 324:7-8; tr. NPNF V p. 433 
10
  9H de\, Le/getai, fhsi\, para_ tw~n sofw~n mikro&j tij ei]nai ko&smoj o( a1nqrwpoj, tau~ta perie/xwn 
e0n e9autw|~ ta_ stoixei=a, oi[j to_ pa~n sumpeplh&rwtai. PG46: 28:23-6; Oehler 324:17-18. 
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1. Astronomy: the size of the sun and the phases of the moon  [PG 46: 32-3; 
Oehler 325:11 – 327:2]  
 In this passage Macrina develops her argument that sense perception and 
reason together are necessary for a correct understanding of the world.  She has just 
illustrated this with the example of a doctor who uses his senses of touch, sight, 
hearing and even smell to diagnose an illness, and concludes – supposedly quoting 
words from ‘one of those educated in pagan things’11 – that ‘it is the mind which sees 
and the mind which hears’.12  In her translation of De anima et resurrectione, 
Catharine Roth suggests that Gregory is alluding to Epicharmus.13  This may indeed 
be the case, but Macrina’s words are also surely a more general reference to 
philosophical debates about the epistemological value of the senses.  This debate goes 
back to some of the Platonic dialogues, in particular the Phaedo and the Republic.  
For example, in the Phaedo Socrates asks: 
‘Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge? Is the body a 
hindrance or not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom?  What 
I mean is this: Have the sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or 
is it true, as the poets are always telling us, that we neither hear nor see 
any thing accurately? And yet if these two physical senses are not 
accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be, for they are inferior to 
these. Do you not think so?’14  
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 tij ta\ tw~n e1cw pepaideume/nwn PG46: 32:9; Oehler 325:39-40 (following Oehler’s text).  
12
 PG46: 32:10-11; Oehler 325:39-41.   
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 Roth, p. 38 n.2, cites Epicharmus, fr.249, quoted by Theodoret in De Fide 1: ‘The mind sees and the 
mind hears; the rest is deaf and blind’. 
14
 Phaedo 65a-b, tr. H. N. Fowler in Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Loeb Classical 
Library (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, 1953); c.f. 65e-66a 
‘[Socrates:] “Would not that man do this most perfectly who approaches each thing, so far as possible, with 
the reason alone, not introducing sight into his reasoning nor dragging in any of the other senses along with 
his thinking, but who employs pure, absolute reason in his attempt to search out the pure, absolute essence 
of things, and who removes himself, so far as possible, from eyes and ears, and, in a word, from his whole 
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Socrates cites as a particular cause of disappointment Anaxagoras’ explanation of 
celestial phenomena.15  In the Republic, famously, Socrates is portrayed as being 
interested in astronomy not insofar as it has a practical use, but only insofar as one 
can rise above the perception of material phenomena towards an immaterial truth.  He 
criticises astronomers for being too fixated with the phenomena as such.16  Many later 
writers tempered this position, taking a slightly more positive view of the role of the 
senses, but also of astronomy as a discipline in itself.  Macrina’s words are, for 
example, strikingly reminiscent of a passage from Philo’s De congressu eruditionis 
gratia: 
The eyes see, but the mind through the eyes sees further than the eyes.  
The ears hear, but the mind through the ears hears better than the ears.   
The nostrils smell, but the soul through the nose smells more vividly 
than the nose, and while the other senses apprehend the objects proper 
to them, the understanding apprehends with more purity and clarity.  
For we may say quite properly that the mind is the eye’s eye, the 
hearing’s hearing and the purified sense of each of the senses;  it uses 
them as ushers in its tribunal, but itself passes judgment on the natures 
of the objects presented, giving its assent to some and refusing it to 
others.17 
Nevertheless, in his treatise, Philo distinguishes ‘arts’ (or ‘intermediate arts’) – which  
proceed by ‘simple observations’ – from ‘science’, which advances ‘with greater 
accuracy and with exceedingly careful investigation’.  Astronomy and geometry, 
grammar, music, rhetoric and dialectic are arts, each of which observes a particular 
                                                                                                                                                 
body, because he feels that its companionship disturbs the soul and hinders it from attaining truth and 
wisdom? Is not this the man, Simmias, if anyone, to attain to the knowledge of reality?” ’ 
15
 Phaedo 97b – 8e 
16
 Republic 528a – 530c 
17
 Philo De congressu eruditionis gratia §143, tr. F. H. Colson in Philo Volume IV, Loeb Classical Library 
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, 1949). 
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(that is, partial) aspect of the universe and each of which is handmaid to philosophy 
which has as its subject-matter ‘the whole essence, both visible and invisible, of 
existing things’.18  The supreme science – strictly the only true science – is  
philosophy.     
 By Gregory’s day, then, astronomy had become well established as one of the 
classic examples used in the examination of epistemology, the fact that the 
movements of the heavenly phenomena were notoriously difficult both to observe and  
to describe with accuracy.  Gregory’s dialogue fits well into this background, for  
Macrina is portrayed as illustrating her point about sense and reason with two 
examples from basic astronomy.  However, as we shall see, astronomy is valued  very 
highly in De anima et resurrectione: Macrina’s argument implies that when done well 
it proceeds ‘with… accuracy and with exceedingly careful investigation’, to use 
Philo’s words.  Perhaps for Gregory, then, astronomy can in itself be a science.  For 
Plato (in some dialogues such as the Phaedo and the Republic) the senses were a 
hindrance to true knowledge, and astronomy was only good insofar as it led the mind 
away from the senses.  Philo gives a more positive role to the senses, provided they 
are judged by the mind, but firmly situates the senses, together with disciplines based 
on sense-perception (like astronomy) in an inferior position as philosophy’s 
handmaids.  In De anima et resurrectione Gregory seems to be moderating the 
original Platonic position still further, by being even more positively disposed 
towards the senses than Philo and – as we shall see – by appearing to regard 
disciplines like astronomy as important and interesting in themselves. 
 Macrina introduces her examples from astronomy as if she were reminding 
Gregory what he had been taught by his teacher (indeed, it is more than likely that 
Gregory’s education involved some astronomy).  In each case, she reminds Gregory 
that things are often not what they first appear to be, but that one can understand the 
truth by reasoning through one’s perception of appearances.  Thus, in the case of the 
sun, it is not merely as big as the disk in the sky, as it seems to most people, but it is 
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many times bigger.  This we can tell by using our reason, working to a conclusion 
‘through’ the examination of the phenomena in the heavens (dia_ tw~n fainome/nwn: 
326:6, c.f. 326:8) – that is, what kind of movement the sun has, its distance from the 
earth and other planets measured in terms of space and time, and the causes of 
eclipses.  Similarly, with the moon: by looking at the waxing and the waning of the 
moon, one is taught ‘through’ the phenomena of these phases (dia_ tw~n fainome/nwn: 
326:40) about the nature of the moon itself, in particular that of all the planets it has 
the orbit closest to the earth and that it has no light of its own but shines with light 
reflected from the sun.  Macrina then proceeds to give a more detailed explanation of 
the phases of the moon.   
 Although the argument concerning the moon is much longer than that about 
the sun, the basic structure of the two is very similar:  
- there is an initial emphasis on looking (ble/pwn: 326:1 and 7);  
- Macrina then contrasts correct looking with the perceptions of most people 
(toi=j polloi=j: 326:2) or those who look in an unexamined way (toi=j 
a0neceta&stwj ble/pousin: 326:13-14); 
- in both cases there is a tension between saying, on the one hand, that mere 
appearances/mere phenomena are not enough and, on the other hand, that 
reason uses appearances to achieve true understanding: hence the stress on 
learning through the appearances (dia_ tw~n fainome/nwn: 326: 6, 8, 40). 
With regard to this last point, Gregory’s Greek relies on the ambiguity of the Greek 
ta fainome/na, which can mean ‘that which is apparent’ in a neutral sense; and, more 
negatively, ‘that which appears to be the case [but is not]’.  These meanings are in 
addition to a more technical sense of ta fainome/na, that is, celestial phenomena, a 
meaning found, for example, in the title of the work of Eudoxus, which famously 
became the basis of a didactic poem with the same name by Aratus.  In the first 
example, Macrina’s argument moves from a description of the way in which the sun 
appears to be a disk in the sky (but is not) to a discussion of much more complex 
fainome/na, that is, the sun’s movements and eclipses.  Similarly with the moon, 
Macrina notes that it appears to shine with its own light, and that it appears to change 
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shape, but argues that a closer examination of the fainome/na of the moon’s 
movements shows otherwise.  Through these examples, Macrina teaches Gregory that 
one cannot achieve deep understanding by looking at the phenomena of the heavens 
in an unreasoning way.  Rather, there is ‘something looking through the sense of sight 
which can use the things which come to perception as guides to penetrate through the 
appearances to that which is not [a mere] appearance’.19  She compares this process to 
the use of geometrical diagrams which point to, or prompt the mind to conceive of, 
concepts which transcend the marks on the page.  But – unlike Plato in the Republic – 
this is a comparison.  Macrina does not reduce astronomy to the search for immaterial 
truths: it is the search for a truth about the world. 
Besides the use of the ambiguity in the term ta fainome/na, there is also in 
this passage some playful variation on the theme of teachers and teaching.  At the 
beginning of her speech Macrina is herself introduced as Gregory’s teacher –  h( 
dida&skaloj.20  The section on astronomy begins with Macrina reminding Gregory 
how he was taught by his astronomy teacher (e0dida&xqhj para_ tou~ didaska&lou), 
and closes with Macrina’s remark that in fact Gregory’s sight is his teacher (o(ra|~j 
oi3wn soi gi/netai h( o!yij dida&skaloj) a comment which closely echoes what she 
said with regard to the doctor: ‘His eye teaches him…’ (dida&sketai de\ kai\ u9po_ tou~ 
o)pqalmou=).21 
This preoccupation with teaching and with the contrast of how things appear 
and how they really are, should alert us, I think to the fact that Gregory is not 
interested in the astronomical phenomena in themselves, but is also using them for his 
own philosophical and theological ends.  This conclusion is perhaps not very 
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 Roth, p. 40 adapted by author; PG46 28:24-9; Oehler 326:38-41: to_ dia_ tw~n o1yewn ble/pwn, o4 toi=j 
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 PG46 32:13; Oehler 326:1-2; PG46: 33:24; Oehler 326:37; PG46: 29:39; Oehler, 325: 23-4  (Roth, p. 
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surprising, but I emphasise it because both here and in many other places Gregory 
describes phenomena in the natural world in a lot of detail.  Indeed, his detailed 
accounts of such things as the phases of the moon, have been used by some writers to 
argue for his authorship of ‘Letter 38’, which was traditionally attributed to Basil and 
in which the author indulges in a long explanation of the phenomenon of rainbows.22  
Such detail, such a tendency to get carried away with the details of the description is, 
it is argued, much more typical of Gregory’s style than Basil’s.  This is, I think, the 
case.  But the relatively detailed nature of such descriptions should not lure us into 
thinking that Gregory’s interest in science is anything more than that of a relative 
amateur (a well-educated gentleman), nor into thinking that he is describing cutting-
edge ancient science. 
A closer examination of the case at hand should make this clear.  Gregory is 
claiming that the correct observation of the phases of the moon should reveal that the 
moon has the orbit nearest the earth and that the moon is lit by the sun which, one can 
deduce from Gregory’s remarks, has the next closest orbit to the earth.  (Gregory, is 
of course, working with the model of a geocentric universe).  But neither of these 
claims was new.  The Presocratic writer Anaxagoras is credited with being the first to 
discover the causes of the moon’s phases and eclipses and he also claimed that the 
moon got its light from sun.23  This latter point is reported in Plato’s Cratylus, which 
remarks on Anaxagoras’ ‘recent doctrine’ that the moon reflected the sun’s light.24  
Anaxagoras’ views are reflected in Plato’s own cosmology elsewhere in his writings: 
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 Thus see P. Fedwick ‘A commentary of Gregory of Nyssa or the 38th Letter of Basil of Caesarea’, in 
Orientalia Christiana Periodica 44 (1978), 31-51.  The evidence is usefully reviewed by Anna Silvas 
Gregory of Nyssa: The Letters Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 83 (Brill, Leiden, 2007), p. 247-9. 
23
 See D. R. Dicks Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle (Thames and Hudson, London, 1970),  p. 57-9, 
citing Anaxagoras Frg. B18 (the sun gives the moon its light) and Hippolytus Refutatio omnium haeresium 
i.8.7-9 (on the moon, its position and eclipses); see also James Evans, The History and Practice of Ancient 
Astronomy, (OUP, NY/Oxford, 1998), p. 46. 
24
 Plato, Cratylus 409a, tr. Harold N. Fowler in Plato, Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, Loeb 
Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, 1921). 
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the myth of the cave in the Republic implies that the moon reflects light from the 
sun;25 the myth of Er in book X states this explicitly.26   
After Plato, Greek astronomical theory sought to explain the motion and 
positions of the moon, sun and planets with more precision.  Eudoxus (c. 390 – c. 
340) was probably the first Greek astronomer to use systematic mathematical 
calculations to explain the irregularities in the movements of the moon and the sun.27  
Hipparchus (c. 190 BC – ca. 120 BC) refined this work to yield ‘the first 
quantitatively adequate account’ of these irregularities.28  Both seem to have 
calculated the eclipses of the moon using a combination of observation and 
Babylonian records.29  Hipparchus’ work was summarised in Ptolemy’s Almagest, a 
massive and ground-breaking second century AD astronomical work, which recorded, 
analysed and corrected previous astronomers’ findings.  Even if Gregory did not have 
direct access to it, he would surely have known of its existence.  Nonetheless, 
Ptolemy’s astronomical writing is far more complex than the simple notions put 
forward by Gregory in the De anima et resurrectione.  In the terminology used by 
writers such as Dicks and Kuhn, the work of Eudoxus, Hipparchus and Ptolemy was 
quantitative (using mathematics to establish its conclusions), whereas Gregory’s 
writing on astronomy was qualitative, seeking merely an effective description of the 
phenomenon, not a mathematical analysis which would, for example, enable one to 
predict the timing of future occurrences.  In this Gregory’s writing is perhaps more 
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 Plato, Republic, 516b 
26
 Plato, Republic, 616e: ‘that [body] of the eighth [orbit – i.e. that nearest the earth] took its colour from 
the seventh which shone upon it’ tr. Paul Shorey in Plato, Republic, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann, 1956). 
27
 Dicks, Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle, p. 153 
28
 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA,1957), p. 72. 
29
 Michael Hoskin (ed.) Cambridge Illustrated History of Astronomy (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1997), p. 36ff; A. Pannekoek A History of Astronomy (George Allen and Unwin, London, 
1961), p. 128-9.  On the (contested) influence of Babylonian on Greek astronomy, particularly Eudoxus’ 
earlier use of Babylonian calculations, see Dicks, Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle, pp. 165-75.    
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similar to Aratus’ hugely popular, but non-mathematical, third century BC poem 
based on Eudoxus’ work.  
Other arguments which are similar to Gregory’s descriptions of the moon can 
be found in Plutarch dialogue On the Face which appears in the Moon (De facie) and 
this work offers a clue, I think, to Gregory’s own choice of example.  In De facie, 
before the apparent shadows on the moon’s surface can be explained, the question of 
whether the moon shines with its own light or that of the sun has to be settled.30  It 
thus becomes apparent that despite the work of writers like Anaxagoras centuries 
before, the question of the sun’s light, far from being settled, had become a bone of 
contention not so much between astronomers as between the various philosophical 
schools.  Whilst the Academicians followed Plato in asserting that the moon was 
composed of earthy matter and shone with light reflected from the sun, the Peripatetic 
school asserted that the moon (like all planets) was made of the ‘fifth substance’ 
ether, and the Stoics claimed that the moon shone with its own light.31  Without going 
into the details of the dialogue, it is clear that De facie reveals Macrina’s description 
of the moon as being part and parcel of later Platonism’s standard assertions about 
cosmology.  In sum, this – together with the aforementioned emphasis on teaching, 
perception and appearances – firmly situates Gregory’s comments on the moon in a 
philosophical rather than in a scientific context.   
Of course, in this period there was not always a clear distinction between 
‘natural science’ and ‘natural philosophy’: what I am claiming, however, is that 
Gregory’s comments relate to fundamental propositions about the make-up of the 
universe – to cosmology – rather than to the complex arithmetical or geometrical 
models for understanding particular phenomena or to anything other than the most 
basic of observations.  Gregory gives an air of authenticity to his dialogue by 
mentioning diagrams at the end of our section, but whether he could describe these in 
any more detail is, I think, rather doubtful.  His technique here can perhaps be 
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 Plutarch De facie 921ff 
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 See e.g. De facie 921E – 923A 
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compared to his procedure in his Against Fate: there, in response to an accusation that 
he knows nothing of ‘celestial things’, Gregory reveals that he knows enough to give 
an account of the movement of the stars which provides a philosophical ground for 
dismissing the concept of fate.32 
In sum, the more weighty lesson to be drawn from Macrina’s use of astronomy 
concerns not cosmology, but epistemology.  The reader is taught that appearances are 
deceptive and that they need to be interpreted using reason: it is the mind which sees.  
However, the author’s emphasis that good understanding of the world depends on 
reasoning through sense perception, his use of the double meaning of the term 
phainomena and the repetition of the idea that one’s eyes (or ears or nose) are 
ultimately good teachers all draw the reader to a complementary idea: that the 
immaterial intellect works in harmony with and through the material body.  To put it 
another way: while the ‘apparent’ focus of the example is on the immaterial (reason), 
there is an equally important, but less obvious, emphasis on the material (the senses).  
Turning to our second example, we will see that its scientific model functions in a 
similar way. 
 
2.  The vacuum and fluid mechanics: the creation of a device which makes a pipe 
sound when water is poured into it. [PG46: 36-40; Oehler 327:28 – 328:39] 
 
 My second example is complicated by the fact it is far from clear what object, 
or objects, Macrina is describing.  I will begin with an attempt to identify this object  
by focusing carefully on the lines which introduce and follow its description.  I will 
then draw some conclusions about how Gregory uses the example, particularly with 
regard to its epistemological significance.  
 Following Macrina’s masterful demonstration of the nature of perception, 
Gregory tentatively suggests that although the mind may appear to work though the 
senses, in fact it might be the case that there is some dynamic power in the material 
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 Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Fatum GNO vol.III.2, 34:15-16; 35:21-36:13. 
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senses, not a rational soul which transcends them.  He argues that people are not so 
silly as to think that there is an immaterial soul in objects made ‘by machine-makers’ 
(u(po_ tw~n  mhxanopoiw~n)  simply because the objects move and ‘speak in some 
kind of voice’ (fqo&ggon tina_ u(pokri/netai).33  Here I think that Gregory is referring 
to the sort of automata famously described by Hero of Alexandria: models of humans, 
animals or gods, which were made to move by various means, including the flow of 
water and the use of heat and steam.34  Gregory might also be referring to 
contraptions which were used on the theatre stage and which moved and made 
sounds.35 
 Macrina’s reply can be helpfully divided into three parts. She first asserts that 
actually such automata prove her point, since although they do not have souls 
themselves, they could not exist without human designers with rational souls who 
observe the characteristics of water and air, and then create and design machines 
which use those forces in their operation.36  Secondly, she expounds this thought by 
describing one particular object which works on the principle that there is no such 
thing as a vacuum in an apparently empty jar.  I will discuss the identity of this 
mystery object below.37  Thirdly, after describing this object, Macrina concludes that 
no such things arise ‘automatically’ (au)toma&twj – a pun perhaps?38).  Neither does 
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 PG46: 33:45 – 36:7; Oehler 327:10-16; reading mhxanopoiw~n with PG46: 33:46. 
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 ‘Automaton’ is to be understood in a minimal sense here, as a model with one or two moving or 
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form. 
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‘represent’ a character in a drama (see: Liddell and Scott Greek-English Lexikon 9th edition). 
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 PG46: 36:25-35; Oehler 327:28-35   
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 PG46: 36:36 – 37:27; Oehler 327:36-328:19 
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 Hero uses the word au)to&maton for an automaton-like device in Pneumatics: Greek text ed. Wilhelm 
Schmidt, Herons von Alexandria Druckwerke und Automatentheater (Teubner, Leipzig, 1976), i:10:3; 
i:42:59.     
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the object she has described occur automatically, nor do bronze statues form 
themselves, nor does air resonate by itself, nor does water flow uphill of its own 
accord.39  Although these phenomena are strung together at apparent random, I think 
that it is plausible, given Gregory’s probable reference to an automaton above, that in 
these concluding remarks Macrina is meaning to indicate several aspects of such an 
automaton: the bronze statue, the pipes within it which are specially constructed to 
imitate a voice, the water flowing into it to make the statue move and/or the pipes 
sound. 
 Given this context, it seems to me to be very likely that the mystery object 
which Macrina describes is a simplified example of the sort of mechanism which 
causes sound to come from such an automaton.  In other words, it is not a water-
organ, as some editions claim.40  This is supported by a closer look at Gregory’s text.  
Macrina argues that the designers of such objects noticed that moving air is necessary 
for the production of sound.41  They then addressed the question of how to make air 
move within a machine (tw|~ mhxanh&mati).42  This question was solved by reflection 
on the principle that there is no such thing as a container being truly empty (keno_n).43  
This principle, Macrina claims, was derived from the observation that a jar when 
placed in water, does not fill immediately and that, in particular, the air leaving it and 
water entering create a ‘fight’ (ma&xh) in the neck of the jar causing the water to 
‘gurgle’ and ‘foam’ (a)nakogxulia&zein to_ u3dwr periafri/zon).44  Having observed 
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 See Roth’s translation of The soul and the resurrection, p. 42, n.4; W. Moore’s translation NPNF V, p. 
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 PG46: 36:36-7; Oehler 327:36-37 
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which is used in Hero Pneumatics i:15:14. 
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this phenomenon, Macrina claims, someone then made a receptacle (to_ koi=lon) 
which was both water-tight (steganh~j) and air-tight (a)dia&pneuston).45  They 
introduced water into the receptacle through a mouth (dia_ sto&matoj [Migne]; dia_ 
stomi/ou [Oehler]), measuring it according to their need; there was also a pipe (to\n 
au0lo\n), for the exit of air, opposite the mouth into which the water is introduced.46  
The pipe was constructed in such a way that when air ran through it, it made a sound.  
Macrina’s description concludes by saying that when water is poured through the 
mouth ‘the air, compressed by the water more forcefully, becomes a breath and when 
it encounters the construction of the pipe it makes a call’.47 
 I think that this is a simplified description of a basic mechanism such as those 
described by Hero of Alexandria in his work on pneumatics.  For example, Hero 
describes a water-tight, air-tight box with two pipes in the top surface, but at opposite 
ends. 48  One, like a funnel directs water into the box via a pipe which is fitted in such 
a way as to make the back-flow of air up the pipe virtually impossible.  At the other 
end, a pipe leads to a small model of a bird or such like.  When a quantity of water is 
poured into the box, the air inside the box is compressed causing a breath to pass out 
of the pipe, making it sound, imitating the voice of a bird.49  Later in the Pneumatics, 
Hero describes how such a device could be adapted to various more complex 
                                                 
45
 PG46: 37:15-17; Oehler 328:13-14 
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 PG46: 37:17-20; Oehler: 328:14-6 
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 e0kqlibo&menoj de\ tw|~ u3dati biaio&teron o( a)h_r pneu~ma gi/netai: o3per e0kpi/pton th|~ kataskeuh|~ tou~ 
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 Hero of Alexandria Pneumatics, tr. Bennet Woodcroft, facsimile edition ed. Marie Hall (Macdonald, 
London,1971), for the simplest device, see section 14 (‘A bird made to whistle by flowing water’); Schmidt 
[section numbers differ] see: I:15 (Ei0j e1nia a)ggei=a u3datoj e0gxuqe/ntoj melagkoru&fou gi/netai fwnh_ h2 
surigmo&j: kataskeua&zetai de\ ou3twj). 
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 Schmidt I:15:10-13: sumbh&setai ou}n e0gxunome/nou tou~ u3datoj dia_ th~j EZ xw&nhj to_n e0n th|~ ba&sei 
a)e/ra e0kqlibo&menon xwrei=n dia_ tou~ HQK suriggi/ou kai\ to_n h}xon a)podido&nai.  Another container of 
water can be used where the air leaves the pipe, which alters the sound to make the warble characteristic of 
a particular breed of bird.    
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purposes.50   Although he only discusses the imitation of birdsong and trumpets 
playing, it is not improbable that the same principle was applied to other automata, 
even those in human form.51  
 Gregory’s description is clearly not that of a water-organ (hydraulikos organos 
or sometimes hydraulis).  For one thing, these were extremely complex pieces of 
machinery: Gregory’s example has neither the multiple pipes nor the keys which were 
a feature of such machines, allowing the player to create a melody. The machine 
Macrina describes seems able to play only one note and the note is produced directly 
with the influx of water, without the intervening manipulation of a key.  More 
importantly, ancient water-organs lacked the essential feature which Macrina appears 
to describe: that is, the influx of water and the out-flow of air.  The water-organ 
described by Hero of Alexandria created sound by the in-flow of air and out-flow of 
air.  The movement of air was created by someone pumping a large lever; the 
machine was named a water-organ because it contained a certain amount of water 
which acted to maintain a constant air-pressure, so that a sequence of notes could be 
sounded without interruption regardless of the position of the lever pumping the air.  
Hero also describes another alternative organ which used wind-power to maintain the 
flow of air.52  In many accounts of ancient music, Ctesibius is credited with the 
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 Woodcroft, sections 43 (‘Notes from a bird produced at intervals by an intermittent stream of water’) and 
44 (‘Notes produced from several birds in succession, by a stream of water’).  Schmidt: II:4 ( 0Ek 
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Schmidt I:43  0Orga&nou kataskeuh&, w3ste a)ne/mou suri/zontoj h}xon a)potelei=sqai au)lou~.   
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invention of the water-organ: his device too (at least as it is described by Vitruvius) 
depended on water for the maintenance of steady air-pressure but also required the 
introduction of air using bellows or similar.53   
 Gregory uses neither the term u9drauliko_n o!rganon nor u3draulij.  There are 
some similarities of expression between the descriptions of the water-mechanism in 
his and Hero’s text, although not so striking as to give one confidence that he is 
alluding to Hero’s very account.54  Macrina’s description of the water-device is full of 
unusual words, which Gregory appears to have borrowed from all over the place, or – 
in at least one case – invented himself.55  The passage is clearly intended to 
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 Vitruvius, The Ten Books of Architecture Book X.8 (Vitruvius does not explicitly say that he is 
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 As has been noted by previous commentators, Gregory and the other Cappadocians are fond of using 
unusual words – particularly those formed by the piling up of several prefixes.  For example, the passage 
currently being discussed contains the following words: e0pipola/zein (float to the surface) found in e.g. 
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e.g. Aristotle, Galen (many times in De usu pulsuum); many later medical writers, including Oribasius; 
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demonstrate Gregory’s ability to produce verbal fireworks, but as a result it is not 
possible to trace the description of the water-device back to one particular source with 
certainty using verbal echoes alone.    
 More convincing is an argument from the context, particularly the fact that the 
dialogue seems to be referring to automata before and after the description of the 
object, as I have already explained above.  Furthermore, the order in which Macrina 
describes the creative process is in some ways similar to the structure of the Proem to 
Hero’s work on pneumatics.  Hero first deals with the problem of the vacuum (peri\ 
kenou=): ‘vessels which seem to most men to be empty are not empty, as they suppose, 
but full of air’.56  He then proves this by giving an account of simple experiments with 
pots and water.  These experiments are not identical with Macrina’s example of the 
water-jar, but their explication does contain the vivid phrase ‘the air when set in 
motion becomes wind’, which closely echoes the conclusion of Macrina’s description 
of the water-mechanism.57  Hero’s work then proceeds through descriptions of basic 
water-mechanisms, such as the one discussed here, and from them to more and more 
complex automata.  This is similar to the sequence taken by Macrina: discussion of 
the vacuum, example of a simple mechanism, conclusion with reference to the 
component parts of a larger mechanism.  The major difference is that Macrina 
announces her interest in automata right from the start. 
 I think, then, it is very likely that in De anima et resurrectione Macrina is 
describing not a musical instrument, but a simple water-mechanism which could form 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hero of Alexandria (many times); also a favourite of the Cappadocians.  Texts searched using the 
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part of an automaton. I would hazard a guess that Gregory had either read Hero 
himself, or had read texts based closely on Hero’s work.  As with description of the 
phases of the moon, what Macrina describes is not based on very complex science or 
even on a very complex mechanism.  It does reveal Gregory of Nyssa’s knowledge of 
basic scientific principles, and of the fact that he held to some basic scientific-
philosophical principles such as the denial of the existence of a void (which is, of 
course, famously discussed by Aristotle and others).58  
 But what is the aim of the example in the context of the dialogue as a whole?  
The point of it is to show that humans have rational souls.  Its main object is not to 
present the automaton as an example of something material which is moved by 
something immaterial; this is because the common understanding of air as an invisible 
but quasi-material something (rather than nothing), would play into the hands of those 
(notably Stoics) who claimed that the soul was a material, albeit a superior material 
element, pervading the body.  Instead, Gregory has Macrina argue that the existence 
of such automata shows that humans have rational souls because such machines could 
not have come into existence, as she says, ‘automatically’.   
 Macrina’s example, then, is a version of an argument from design – in this 
case not seeking to prove the existence of God from the presence of order in the 
universe, but rather seeking to show the existence of the immaterial human rational 
soul from the design of an automaton. The whole section on the automaton implicitly 
harks back to Macrina’s complaints about Epicurus and his like who failed to 
recognise such a connection between design and a maker: 
While the sight of a garment suggests to any one the weaver of it, and 
the thought of the shipwright comes at the sight of the ship, and the 
hand of the builder is brought to the mind of him who sees the building, 
these little souls gaze upon the world, but their eyes are blind to Him 
whom all this that we see around us makes manifest.59  
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 Aristotle, Physics Book VI especially parts 6-9. 
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 PG46: 24:4-10; Oehler 322:29-33; tr.NPNF V, p. 432 
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 The description of the automaton and the machine which makes a sound are, 
therefore, not primarily analogies about the invisible driving the visible.60  They argue 
that one can reason from observation of the construction of these objects to the 
existence of an human rational and immaterial soul.  They remind the reader that 
humans are created in God’s image, not only in the sense of their rationality, but in 
their ability to create – albeit at a far more basic level.  However, the example of the 
automaton places in the reader’s mind a disanalogy: humans can create human models 
which are purely material and which can only do what their human designers decide 
in advance; on the other hand, God can create humans endowed with rational, 
immaterial souls, who can act freely and of their own accord.  Again, this recalls a 
comment Macrina made earlier in the treatise about Epicurus:  
The nature of things was to his mind a fortuitous and mechanical affair 
(tuxai/a tij kai\ au)to&matoj h( tw~n o1ntwn u(penoh&qh fu&sij), 
without a Providence penetrating its operations; and, as a piece with 
this, he thought that human life was like a bubble, existing only as long 
as the breath (to_ pneu~ma) within was held in by the enveloping 
substance, inasmuch as our body was a mere membrane, as it were, 
encompassing a breath; and that on the collapse of the inflation the 
imprisoned essence was extinguished.61 
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Epicurus’ concept of human nature sounds very much like Macrina’s description of 
the automaton – a material container encompassing material breath.  In this context, 
therefore, Epicurus’ mistake is revealed to be not only ignoring the argument from 
design, but also impiously reducing God’s creation to the level of something that even 
humans could create.  
 However, the section of the dialogue which deals with the automaton also re-
emphasises what had been established by the astronomical examples: that knowledge 
requires the cooperation of both reason and the senses.  In order to do this the 
character Macrina puns on the term ta_ fainome/na and its cognates, just as she did 
earlier:   
Is it not clearly proved by what we can see ( ]Ar' ou) fanerw~j 
dei/knutai dia_ tw~n fainome/nwn) that there is in man a mind, 
something else besides what we can see (a1llo ti para_ to_ 
faino&menon)?  By the invisible intelligence of its own nature the mind 
makes such plans by thought within itself; then as we have described, 
through material assistance it brings into the open the concept that 
exists within.62 
In this way Gregory stresses that correct ideas come about through the observation of 
physical phenomena (dia_ tw~n fainome/nwn) – in this case, the existence of a void is 
disproved by the close observation of the material reactions of air and water in a 
hollow container.63  The vivid language which is used to describe the action of water 
and air in the neck of the container emphasises the senses used: in Gregory’s 
descriptions one hears the gurgle/plash of the water, one sees and feels the water 
foam.64  Furthermore, in both cases correct knowledge depends on the observation of 
movement: the cycles of the heavenly bodies and the movement of the automaton 
(including the movement of water and air which creates sound – which itself is 
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considered as a movement).  For Gregory, movement is an archetypal quality of 
creation, both material and immaterial. 
 In sum, while Gregory’s examples from astronomy establish the idea that one 
should reason dia_ tw~n fainome/nwn – through material phenomena – his second 
example of the automaton and its component parts, both reinforces this 
epistemological principle and applies it to a specific enquiry: the question of whether 
the soul exists. 
 
Conclusion. 
Gregory was not a scientist, in either the modern or the ancient sense.  He 
reports fairly basic phenomena and gives fairly basic explanations.  His descriptions 
are more complex than those found in most contemporary Christian theological 
treatises, but that is not a very high standard!  He is most interested in the 
philosophical-theological principles underlying the scientific phenomena.  However, 
these scientific examples should not be viewed merely as somewhat long-winded 
ways to make a fundamental philosophical point: rather, the way in which Gregory 
describes the phenomenon should be attended to.  On one level, his descriptions 
reveal his characteristic wide-eyed wonder at the complexity of the world and its 
objects, both natural and man-made – a feature which can also be seen, for example, 
in his discussion of tears, laughter and dreams in the De hominis opificio, of the 
rainbow in Letter 38 (formerly attributed to Basil), of a garden in his letter to 
Adelphius.65  On a more profound level, the language and style of the descriptions, 
the way in which they highlight and echo themes present elsewhere in the dialogue, 
the way they employ the sophisticated interplay of analogy and disanalogy: all these 
literary techniques remind us that although Gregory was no man of science, he was a 
consummate man of letters. 
With regard to the example from astronomy, it is striking that Gregory’s 
comments on good philosophical method – that the immaterial intellect should work 
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through the material senses; that neither mind nor body sufficient on its own to 
understand the world – support the main theological thrust of the thesis: that humans 
are inextricably both material and immaterial.66  An emphasis on the positive nature 
of materiality is of course particularly important in this work which counters a 
Platonic belief in the immortality of the soul (as exemplified, for example, in the 
Phaedo), with a robustly material doctrine of the resurrection of the body.  At a basic 
level the examples about the sun and moon establish the basic fact that one can reason 
about difficult things using a mixture of mind and senses.  In addition, through using 
astronomical examples, Gregory highlights the importance of the senses – somewhat 
unexpectedly, perhaps, given that he began with the counter-example of Epicurus 
who wrongly only used sense experience.  This section thus moves from the rejection 
of materialism, to an emphasis on the crucial role of reason, to the affirmation of the 
value of reason (the immaterial) and senses (the material) working together. 
This method is similar to that lying behind the example of the automaton: 
Gregory presents (in his own voice) the sceptical materialist position that perhaps 
humans are just like automata driven by a material invisible breath; this is countered 
by Macrina who uses the example of automata to construct an argument from design 
concluding that mind must be present in human beings if they are capable of 
constructing such objects.  Human might appear to be all matter (just as the sun might 
appear very small); reason however argues for the existence of a soul (just as it argues 
for the sun’s huge size).  However, in order to reach such a conclusion reason must 
work through the careful observation of a material phenomenon: the existence of the 
automaton (just as it must reason from the careful observation of the sun’s 
movements).  In order to emphasise this point that the mind works through materiality 
Macrina not only argues that one reasons through the observation of machines such as 
automata to conclude that the human soul exists, but she also emphasises the point 
that the human mind solved the problem of the vacuum by the close observation of 
the battle of water and air in the neck of a jar.  (A more subtle, but no less telling 
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point is her comment that the mind ‘brings [its ideas] into the open (ei0j to_ e0mfane\j)’ 
by realising them in a material medium (‘with material assistance’ dia_ th~j u(likh~j 
u(phresi/aj).67  Surely for a true Platonist there would be no apparent positive 
evaluation of the realisation of  ideas in the material realm – quite the opposite.)  
Thus the astronomy establishes a general epistemological point – that one 
should reason through the careful observation of material things – which is applied to 
the particular case of the soul in the automaton example.  These examples are thus 
hardly mere decoration, intended to impress the reader of the dialogue with Gregory’s 
scientific knowledge and large vocabulary : they move the argument of the dialogue 
along in a constructive way. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, they exemplify a creative movement from 
materialist scepticism, to an emphasis on the immaterial mind/soul, to a reaffirmation 
of the importance of the senses/the material along with the immaterial soul – a  
movement which is exemplified in the structure of the dialogue as a whole.  Thus  
Gregory begins by presenting (in his own grief-struck voice) the sceptical view: what 
if death is the end of everything?  This is followed by an emphasis on the immortality 
of the soul, but again this is followed by the doctrine of the resurrection which 
stresses the restoration of human nature in its psychosomatic entirety.  Furthermore, 
this dynamic can also be found in the way in which the dialogue surprises the reader 
by gradually working towards a more positive role for the emotions (commonly 
associated with the material in late antique thought), despite the fact that Gregory’s 
grief and anger were portrayed in a very negative light at the beginning of the work.68  
Macrina first seems to assume that emotions are material passions which must always 
be kept under control by reason, but by the end of the dialogue this view is tempered 
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by the idea that love (and on occasion even anger) are required to impel the believer 
towards God.  At both levels, then – epistemological and theological – Gregory 
appears to start with a sceptical or materialist position, counters it with an emphasis 
on the immaterial, then corrects that with his Christian solution: one which asserts the 
reality of the immaterial, whilst acknowledging the goodness of God’s material 
creation.  The examples based on astronomy and automata fit in with, and indeed 
strengthen, this development which runs throughout the dialogue – they are in a sense 
a microcosm of the dialogue as a whole.   
To a large extent, this treatise represents Gregory’s Christian reaction to 
historical and contemporary Platonism.  However, it should also be noted that in 
Plato’s dialogues themselves there is an ambivalence towards the material – 
especially towards the emotions – rather than an outright hostility.  Famously, the 
Symposium and the Phaedrus are much more positive about the role of human love, 
for example.  To this extent, then, the dialogue in the De anima et resurrectione is not 
just a dialogue between Christianity and Platonism, but it is a dialogue inserted into 
an on-going conversation within Platonism between different strands of Plato’s own 
thought.  (The way in which Macrina’s character shifts between Socrates and 
Diotima, and her use of the motif of the soul’s chariot from the Phaedrus alerts us to 
this subtlety.) 
In this context, Gregory’s examples from science are not just interesting in 
their own right (although they do yield interesting insights into what kinds of 
scientific text some fourth-century Greek-speaking fathers might have been reading).  
They are much more interesting for what they reveal about his skill as a writer and the 
subtlety of his thought.  In De anima et resurrectione at least, Gregory is not simply 
showing off his rhetorical skill by using complicated scientific analogies which had 
only a limited application to his case in point but which gave him the excuse to use 
flashy vocabulary.  Nor is he getting carried away with long-winded descriptions as if 
he were not fully in control of his own writing.  The detail and the vocabulary are 
important – as I have tried to show here – because the expression and detail of the 
analogies themselves helps to push forward the argument in the dialogue.  Firstly, 
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they have a function in establishing an appropriate epistemology to be followed in the 
rest of the dialogue: the examples from astronomy show that knowledge is achieved 
through reason and observation working together, then this general principle is 
applied to a specific example to argue from the existence of complex machines that 
there is a human soul.  Secondly, the scientific analogies prepare the reader for the 
importance of the materiality body in the rest of the dialogue: the structure of the 
analogies and the structure of the dialogue itself are united in emphasising the 
importance of God’s creation in both its immaterial and material aspects.  Finally, one 
should add, there is also a sense in which Gregory dwells on the details of heavenly 
phenomena, physical processes and scientific observation because he – unlike many 
of his philosophical contemporaries – thought that they were really important in 
themselves as part of a good, ordered, material creation.  His pausing on the details is 
not rhetorical indulgence: ultimately, Gregory’s scientific analogies matter because, 
for him, matter matters. 
